Stateful domain inspection can examine supported protocol metadata such as TLS SNI without full TLS decryption; it cannot classify traffic lacking the inspected hostname signal; it changes a different aspect of the architecture rather than fulfilling the need to alert on logged inspection denies.

Network Firewall processes packets according to configured stateless and stateful policies; the surrounding subnet/TGW routing must force both relevant directions through the endpoints; the operational gap would remain because the question requires a way to alert on logged inspection denies.

An alert action records a match without necessarily dropping the traffic, while a drop or reject action changes data-plane delivery; rule action and event evidence must be read together; it is not the action that directly makes the system alert on logged inspection denies.

Flow Logs aggregate network-flow information over a time window and only cover selected ENIs, subnets, or VPCs; request logs and flow records are not guaranteed one-to-one; it changes a different aspect of the architecture rather than fulfilling the need to distinguish transport flows from HTTP request counts.

Traffic Mirroring copies selected packets so the analyzer can inspect protocol exchanges; VPC Flow Logs record connection metadata rather than full packet payload; the operational gap would remain because the question requires a way to distinguish transport flows from HTTP request counts.

S3 can retain aggregated flow-log objects for cross-account analysis and lifecycle controls when the destination and permissions are configured correctly; it is not the action that directly makes the system distinguish transport flows from HTTP request counts.

DNS response-code observations can distinguish nonexistence responses from failed or timed-out upstream resolution, guiding whether to inspect records or network paths; the operational gap would remain because the question requires a way to audit DNS domain blocks by source VPC.

Resolver query logs capture DNS queries and responses processed by the associated VPC Resolver and can be sent to supported log destinations for analysis; it is not the action that directly makes the system audit DNS domain blocks by source VPC.

DNS Firewall evaluates matching resolver queries and can block listed domains before clients learn the resolved endpoint address; it does not prevent clients from reaching known IPs directly; that still would not establish the requested outcome: audit DNS domain blocks by source VPC.

Network Manager provides centralized views of globally connected networking infrastructure and supported connection or topology events, complementing per-VPC packet-level diagnostics; that still would not establish the requested outcome: aggregate network compliance across accounts.

GuardDuty correlates supported telemetry to generate potential threat findings, which can provide enrichment for triage but are not a packet-by-packet capture of the session; the scenario instead needs an action that will aggregate network compliance across accounts.

Immutable retention and controlled write-only delivery reduce the ability of a compromised source account to alter existing logs after ingestion into a governed archive; those conditions do not produce the required result: aggregate network compliance across accounts.

RAM sharing grants permission to request an attachment, but the TGW owner must accept pending attachment requests unless its attachment auto-acceptance setting handles them; that still would not establish the requested outcome: investigate one transit attachment's packet drops.

TGW Flow Logs provide network-flow metadata observed by the transit gateway and its attachments; ordinary VPC Flow Logs report traffic at their configured VPC resource scope; the scenario instead needs an action that will investigate one transit attachment's packet drops.

A /24 destination route is more specific than a /16 and governs traffic to addresses in that range, regardless of broad propagation from another attachment; it changes a different aspect of the architecture rather than fulfilling the need to investigate one transit attachment's packet drops.

Aggregators collect configuration and compliance information across authorized accounts and Regions to support centralized queries and dashboards, while rule evaluation remains tied to the sources; the scenario instead needs an action that will protect retained network evidence against deletion.

CloudTrail records management-plane API actions such as attachment changes, including caller and timestamp; flow logs cannot identify the actor who modified the control plane; those conditions do not produce the required result: protect retained network evidence against deletion.

Network Access Analyzer evaluates modeled VPC networking configurations against defined access requirements and identifies unintended access patterns without generating live application packets; the operational gap would remain because the question requires a way to protect retained network evidence against deletion.

Reachability Analyzer models supported AWS network configuration, but cannot establish that a process accepts connections or that a host-based filter permits the socket; those conditions do not produce the required result: avoid treating accepted network flow as application success.

Flow Logs classify traffic as accepted or rejected at the interface-level logging view; they do not directly name the exact security-group or NACL rule responsible; the operational gap would remain because the question requires a way to avoid treating accepted network flow as application success.

A network ACL explicitly rejects matching stateless traffic before later broader allow entries; security groups can only grant permitted flows; it is not the action that directly makes the system avoid treating accepted network flow as application success.

Origin Shield adds a centralized caching layer between regional caches and the origin, improving cache reuse for requests arriving through multiple regional caches and reducing duplicate fetches; it changes a different aspect of the architecture rather than fulfilling the need to encrypt both CDN viewer and origin segments.

S3 website endpoints are custom HTTP origins and do not support OAC; the regional REST endpoint can accept CloudFront-signed origin requests while public S3 access remains blocked; the operational gap would remain because the question requires a way to encrypt both CDN viewer and origin segments.

CloudFront origin groups can redirect eligible read requests to a secondary origin when the selected response code matches the failover policy; write operations are not eligible for that origin-group failover behavior; it is not the action that directly makes the system encrypt both CDN viewer and origin segments.

Depending on target type and protocol, NLB client IP preservation may need to be explicitly configured; otherwise targets can observe a translated source address; the operational gap would remain because the question requires a way to preserve TLS pass-through to NLB targets.

ALB security policies govern the protocols and ciphers accepted by its TLS listener; rotating the certificate alone does not disable old protocol versions; it is not the action that directly makes the system preserve TLS pass-through to NLB targets.

NLB TLS access logs provide information about TLS connections handled by supported TLS listeners, helping diagnose negotiated protocol and certificate-related handshake behavior; that still would not establish the requested outcome: preserve TLS pass-through to NLB targets.

Restricting advertised prefixes keeps hybrid routing within the intended enterprise reachability boundary; unnecessary default route advertisements can attract traffic not meant for Direct Connect; it is not the action that directly makes the system encrypt confidential traffic over dedicated links.

Public VIFs exchange public AWS service prefixes and customer public addressing, unlike transit VIFs, which carry hybrid private routes toward TGWs; the scenario instead needs an action that will encrypt confidential traffic over dedicated links.

MACsec protects Ethernet frames on eligible Direct Connect physical links, subject to connection speed, location, and equipment support; it does not replace application-layer encryption throughout the AWS service path; those conditions do not produce the required result: encrypt confidential traffic over dedicated links.

A Direct Connect gateway can connect eligible transit virtual interfaces to TGWs across supported Regions, avoiding a separate VIF per individual VPC; that still would not establish the requested outcome: encrypt eligible physical DX frames.

LAG combines supported same-speed physical connections under one logical construct; individual BGP flow hashing and circuit health still affect realized traffic distribution; the scenario instead needs an action that will encrypt eligible physical DX frames.

A private DX connection supplies dedicated network connectivity but does not inherently guarantee end-to-end payload encryption for all services; overlay encryption must be deliberately deployed when needed; it changes a different aspect of the architecture rather than fulfilling the need to encrypt eligible physical DX frames.