An S3 gateway endpoint bypasses NAT for eligible S3 routes; it does not add source ports for a third-party external server.

A larger subnet allows more workload IPs but does not increase the NAT gateway’s source IP and port combinations.

More clients can intensify port exhaustion. The bottleneck is concurrent mappings per NAT IPv4 source and unique destination.

Native IPv6 provides globally routable addresses without IPv4 translation, while the egress-only gateway denies new inbound connections; that addresses removing unnecessary IPv4 NAT from suitable outbound workloads, rather than full-cost evaluation of dedicated versus Internet hybrid access.

Multiple ports in one facility share environmental and cross-connect risks, so true site resilience needs location diversity; this changes reducing shared facility failure risk in hybrid networking, not the necessary full-cost evaluation of dedicated versus Internet hybrid access.

In the minimizing unnecessary transit data-processing costs workflow, direct peering avoids routing through a charged transit hop, although it requires explicit peer administration and subnet routing; the current case needs full-cost evaluation of dedicated versus Internet hybrid access.

A rate rule identifies unusually frequent requests, but ordinary-rate requests can still contain SQL injection payloads. SQLi-specific inspection is needed for the stated attack class.

Geography rules evaluate source location, not SQL syntax patterns in query parameters or request bodies. A permitted location is not evidence of a safe SQL request.

Transport-layer TCP forwarding does not parse HTTP request parameters for SQL injection attempts. The already deployed WAF web ACL is the proper layer for managed SQLi rules.

WAF evaluates application-layer request properties and managed or custom rules to block malicious HTTP patterns before forwarding; that addresses application-layer web request filtering, rather than stateless subnet-wide packet filtering with deny rules.

Network Firewall inspects flows with stateful rule evaluation and can apply supported Suricata or domain-oriented rules at routed inspection endpoints; this changes managed stateful deep inspection of VPC flows, not the necessary stateless subnet-wide packet filtering with deny rules.

In the bidirectional ENI-level traffic-policy assessment workflow, security groups filter both traffic directions, and overly broad outbound permissions can undermine restrictive inbound application topology; the current case needs stateless subnet-wide packet filtering with deny rules.

This produces inspected outbound connectivity from private workloads: Centralized egress controls outbound paths at routing and firewall layers while workload subnets remain unexposed to an Internet gateway; the stem instead tests stateless subnet-wide packet filtering with deny rules.

ENI-level security groups distinguish callers even when multiple hosts reside in one subnet that shares a NACL; this belongs to resource-specific database ingress separation, while the problem is stateful source-restricted access from load balancer to target.

Interface endpoints use ENIs and security groups; traffic needs network admission at those endpoint interfaces; this changes private endpoint interface security-group authorization, not the necessary stateful source-restricted access from load balancer to target.

In the controlled public TLS entry with nonpublic backend access workflow, the ALB provides public TLS ingress and forwards only permitted traffic to private targets whose security groups restrict caller sources; the current case needs stateful source-restricted access from load balancer to target.

Centralized egress controls outbound paths at routing and firewall layers while workload subnets remain unexposed to an Internet gateway; this belongs to inspected outbound connectivity from private workloads, while the problem is blocking a specific source using an explicit network deny.

Stateful security groups can match source security-group identity rather than broadly allowing an entire VPC or unpredictable load-balancer addresses; this changes stateful source-restricted access from load balancer to target, not the necessary blocking a specific source using an explicit network deny.

In the resource-specific database ingress separation workflow, ENI-level security groups distinguish callers even when multiple hosts reside in one subnet that shares a NACL; the current case needs blocking a specific source using an explicit network deny.

Security controls start with routing and address exposure: without direct public ingress, Internet hosts cannot address the private interface directly; this belongs to no direct Internet ingress to private compute, while the problem is inspected outbound connectivity from private workloads.

NAT gateway enables outbound-initiated IPv4 communication from private addresses without exposing those addresses as inbound endpoints; this changes egress without public IP assignment on workloads, not the necessary inspected outbound connectivity from private workloads.

In the stateful-looking outbound-only IPv6 gateway control workflow, egress-only internet gateways allow IPv6 outbound connections and their replies without offering public initiation into the VPC; the current case needs inspected outbound connectivity from private workloads.

NACLs evaluate inbound and outbound packets without connection state and support explicit deny actions at the subnet boundary; that addresses stateless subnet-wide packet filtering with deny rules, rather than managed stateful deep inspection of VPC flows.

Firewall Manager coordinates supported WAF, Shield, network firewall, and security-group policies organization-wide; this belongs to centralized multi-account network security policy rollout, while the problem is managed stateful deep inspection of VPC flows.

In the stateful firewall flow symmetry across AZs workflow, appliance mode preserves flow symmetry through a stateful inspection VPC attachment so connection tracking can evaluate both directions; the current case needs managed stateful deep inspection of VPC flows.

GENEVE carried by Gateway Load Balancer uses UDP 6081. A TCP rule for the same numeric port does not permit its packets.

Transit routing controls next hops, not subnet ACL packet admission for encapsulated GENEVE traffic. The UDP 6081 packets still encounter the subnet NACL in the data plane.

UDP 4500 is used for IPsec NAT traversal, not GWLB GENEVE encapsulation on UDP 6081. Permit the documented GENEVE UDP encapsulation instead of the unrelated IPsec NAT-T port.

Central policy scans and enforces supported security-group posture at scale rather than relying on individual account owners to self-audit; that addresses centrally governed exposure of sensitive database ports, rather than organization-wide application firewall policy enforcement.

Shield provides DDoS-focused protections for supported AWS resources, distinct from custom HTTP request conditions in WAF; this changes network and transport DDoS defense for public endpoints, not the necessary organization-wide application firewall policy enforcement.

In the managed stateful deep inspection of VPC flows workflow, network Firewall inspects flows with stateful rule evaluation and can apply supported Suricata or domain-oriented rules at routed inspection endpoints; the current case needs organization-wide application firewall policy enforcement.

This produces controlled public TLS entry with nonpublic backend access: The ALB provides public TLS ingress and forwards only permitted traffic to private targets whose security groups restrict caller sources; the stem instead tests organization-wide application firewall policy enforcement.

The ALB provides public TLS ingress and forwards only permitted traffic to private targets whose security groups restrict caller sources; this belongs to controlled public TLS entry with nonpublic backend access, while the problem is network and transport DDoS defense for public endpoints.

Endpoint policy permissions are an additional authorization boundary for traffic using the endpoint, not a substitute for identity permissions; this changes authorization filtering on private AWS service endpoints, not the necessary network and transport DDoS defense for public endpoints.

In the centralized multi-account network security policy rollout workflow, firewall Manager coordinates supported WAF, Shield, network firewall, and security-group policies organization-wide; the current case needs network and transport DDoS defense for public endpoints.